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This paper aims to contribute to the research agenda on the sources of price rigidity.
Based on broadly accepted assumptions on the behavior of economic agents, we show
that ￿rms￿competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as a sub-game perfect
equilibrium strategy to optimally deal with consumers￿risk aversion, even if ￿rms have
no adjustment costs. To this end, we build a model economy based on consumption
centers with several complete markets and relax some traditional assumptions used in
standard monetary policy models by assuming that households have imperfect information
about the ine¢ cient time-varying cost shocks faced by the ￿rms. Furthermore, we assume
that the timing of events is such that, at every period, consumers have access to the
actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center.
Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk-averse
consumers, competitive ￿rms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize
the price uncertainty and "attract more customers".
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11 Introduction
There is a traditional result in economics stating that, under perfect information among all
agents and with no adjustment costs, the ￿ exible price equilibrium is the most e¢ cient scenario
the economy may be in. And such result relies even under imperfect competition like the
monopolistic one. It is good for ￿rms and good for consumers that earn wages and share ￿rms￿
pro￿ts. Thus price stickiness inputs ine¢ ciency under standard assumptions.
But do real world people have all the information on prices when choosing a supermarket,
or a restaurant for instance, to go? Probably they only have priors based on previous outcomes,
for collecting price information on all goods from all stores, analyzing them and making optimal
decisions based on possible time-varying preferences would take a long period of time.
Thus if prices were fully ￿ exible they would change every day, and real world people would
not be able to construct any complete and updated information set, for the ￿rst collected prices
would be outdated by the time the last price on the list was surveyed.
Such situation would annoy anyone in such situation. Indeed, average people expect prices to
remain unchanged at least for a while, avoiding big surprises! People usually like predictability
on a certain degree in order to make it easier to make some frequent decisions.
That is the key issue we formally model and assess in this paper.
1.1 The literature
Considerable empirical evidence suggests that prices are sticky in the short run. Some pricing
behavior studies as the ones carried out by Blinder et al. (1998), Hall et al. (1997) and
Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2005) suggest that ￿rms do not adjust prices as frequently as the
empirically observed changes in the state of the economy, which occur more often.
Those observations motivated the development of a broad theoretical research agenda about
nominal rigidity modeling, to which the major contribution is Woodford (2003). These so-called
new synthesis models introduce corporate adjustment costs, measures of strategic complemen-
tarity and the presence of di⁄erentiated goods, within a monopolistic competitive environment.
Taking the real business cycle (RBC) analysis structure based on the inter-temporal agents￿
constrained optimization problems, the neoclassical or new-Keynesian features can be obtained
as a result of a particular relationship assumed between the basic parameters on preference
and technology. Furthermore, those parameters de￿ne the degree of strategic complementarity
among the pricing desisions of suppliers of di⁄erent goods, which in turn de￿nes how sticky
prices are.
Moreover, most of the existing analysis on price rigidity directly assumes a source of nominal
rigidity ￿rst introduced by Calvo (1983)1. Brie￿ y speaking, the simplest model state in ad hoc
way that ￿rms maintain their prices ￿xed for two consecutive periods with a certain probability,
independently on the other ￿rms￿behavior. Such a modeling approach has been often used
in monetary policy analysis for allowing a straightforward derivation of the central bank￿ s loss
function, as a second order approach of the welfare function, besides a good empirical adherence
as well as an easy analytical treatment.
In spite of such appealing features, Calvo￿ s type models have been subjected to some criti-
cism due to the fact that the stochastic process governing the exogenous shocks is imposed into
the model economy in a rather ad hoc way. Furthermore, if ￿rms have no adjustment costs, a
1Good references are Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999), Amato e Laubach (2000), Gal￿ et al. (2001), Clarida et al. (2002), Walsh (2003), Woodford (2003),
Giannoni e Woodford (2003), Woodford (2004), Gal￿ and Monacelli (2004), Loyo and Vereda (2004), Alves and
Areosa (2005), Walsh (2005) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006), among others. For a review in adjustment cost
models, instead, good references are Caplin e Leahy (1991), Caballero and Engel (1993), Dotsey et al. (1999),
Bonomo and Garcia (2001) and Bonomo and Almeida (2002), among others.
2Calvo￿ s type economy is not the most e¢ cient one, even with time-invariant ine¢ ciency sources,
for under usual assumptions the adoption of ￿ exible prices will be the optimal choice from both
the ￿rms and consumers point of view. Therefore, there is no reason why ￿rms would ratio-
nally adopt a Calvo￿ s lottery pricing strategy. The case of time-varying ine¢ cient shocks is still
inconclusive, depending on whether consumers prefer a ￿ exible price environment or not.
In order to ￿lter the spectrum of possible theories concerning price stickiness, indicating
correct ways to be followed by future researches, Blinder et al. (1998) surveyed the reasons
why ￿rms do not adopt ￿ exible prices among a signi￿cative sample of 200 ￿rms in the United
States, from several industries. They asked business people about their price-setting practices
and their opinions about which academic theories, expressed in laymen￿ s terms, matched the
actual price-setting procedures in United States. It is interesting to note that, although it
was never asked whether their costumers were averse to price variation, most of the surveyed
￿rms voluntarily mentioned that changing prices would ￿antagonize￿or ￿cause di¢ culties￿with
their customers, and such a fact would be a strong reason why ￿rms fear to adjust their prices.
Indeed, the authors stressed that this issue ￿came up so often that ￿guring out precisely what
it means should be a high-priority item on any future research agenda.￿In a similar work, Hall
et al. (1997) stressed the fact that their surveyed ￿rms ￿stated that physical menu costs of
changing prices were a less important source of price rigidity than the need to preserve customer
relationships.￿And at the same direction, Zbaracki et al. (2004) stated: ￿Changes in prices
harmed the customer perceptions of the ￿rm￿ s reputation, integrity, and reliability.￿
Rotemberg (2002) followed this line and presented a model in which the probability of not
adjusting the prices for two periods is determined on an endogenous way. If consumers￿utility
functions have a psychological component, regarding the expected degree of ￿rms￿altruism,
they strongly react to unfair price increases. Hence, if consumers have imperfect information
about the actual costs, ￿rms will be unwilling to adjust prices so frequently due to the possibility
of being interpreted as an unfair pricing setter by the consumers. The key point of this study
is to regard the consumers￿behavior as the source of price stickiness, as suggested by Blinder
et al. (1998). However, his results apply only to unfair price increases, so consumers￿aversion
to price variations still remains to be carefully understood and analytically treated.
The present study aims to build a model of pricing behavior within the Calvo￿ s basic frame-
work in which the degree of the price rigidity is strategically chosen by pro￿t maximizing ￿rms,
as an optimal decision to deal with the consumer￿ s risk aversion. To this end, we introduce the
concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets
that also compete with each other. We also relax some traditional assumptions used in stan-
dard monetary policy models by assuming that households have imperfect information about
the ine¢ cient time-varying cost shocks faced by ￿rms, e.g. the ones regarding to ine¢ cient
equilibrium output levels under ￿ exible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in
such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the
market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Indeed, in a real world economy
with several consumption centers as supermarkets or shopping malls, for instance, highly fre-
quent decisions on which one to choose are made before knowing the actual prevailing prices
in each of them. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of
risk adverse consumers, competitive ￿rms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to
minimize price uncertainty and "attract more customers". On the other hand, increasing such
a degree reduces the unconditional expected discounted ￿ ow of ￿rms￿pro￿t, so there is a trade
o⁄ between attracting more costumers and increasing pro￿ts.
Based on the above modeling approach, we proof two theorems showing that: (a) there is
no equilibrium in which households always choose the same consumption center; and (b) the
equilibrium degree of price stickiness is the highest, provided that ￿rms have non-negative un-
conditional expected discounted pro￿t ￿ ows, e.g. the unconditional expected discounted pro￿t
3￿ ows will be zero in non-trivial cases. Such a result follows from the two types of competition
inputted in the model. The ￿rst one is the traditional monopolistic competition that allows each
￿rm to choose an optimal price that maximizes its expected discounted pro￿t ￿ ow. The second
one is the Bertrand￿ s ￿ avor competition played by the consumption centers using the degree of
price stickiness in order to be more "attractive" for the households. Therefore, price rigidity
will be an outcome of a broadly accept assumption of consumers risk aversion, formalizing the
research lacuna mentioned by Blinder et al. (1998).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the necessary modeling extensions to
the Woodford￿ s (2003) standard model, formally deriving the main result of this study, namely
the implicitly de￿ned degree of price stickiness in the model economy. Moreover, this section
also presents original contributions to the theoretical analysis on the sources of nominal rigidity.
Section 3 presents the Taylor approximations to the structural results derived in Section 2 and
introduces some related conclusions. Simulations on the endogenous degree of price stickiness
and the volatility of the aggregate variables are also shown in this section. Finally, Section 4
presents some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this section, we introduce an extension to Calvo￿ s type basic model. But now competitive
￿rms strategically choose the degree of price stickiness, which in equilibrium depends on the
economy deep parameters, namely the consumers￿risk aversion and the ones related to the
production function and the stochastic cost shocks distribution.
Furthermore, it depends on the way monetary policy is conducted. Thus, the Lucas￿ s cri-
tique applies in this latter sense. But a similar critique also comes up. Adapting Woodford
(2003) words: since price stickiness depends on the exogenous cost shock distribution, tradi-
tional monetary evaluation exercises using macroeconometric models are ￿ awed by a failure to
recognize that the relations typically estimated, even with quasi-structural equations containing
future expectations derived with an ad hoc imposed nominal rigidity source, are reduced-form
rather than truly structural relations, for structural changes in the stochastic cost shocks gen-
erating process may change the optimal degree of price stickiness chosen by the ￿rms.
As in standard recent literature (see Woodford (2003) for more details), we model a cashless
economy, in which there is a monetary unit of account in terms of which prices are quoted.
This unit of account is de￿ned in terms of a claim to a certain quantity of a liability of the
central bank, which may or may not have any physical existence2.
2As analytically shown in Woodford (2003), such an approach is justi￿ed by two facts:
(a) In an economy in which the central bank uses a short-term nominal interest rate as their instrument, often
empirically characterized by central bank reaction functions as Taylor type rules, the old theoretical
models considering money growth targets are not convenient since it is not necessary to ￿rst determine
the endogenous evolution of money supply in order to understand the consequences, in terms of product,
in￿ ation and welfare, of such interest rate rules. Money, prices and interest rates are rather simultaneously
determined given a central bank reaction function;
(b) In an economy in which households optimally choose to hold money balances in order to reduce transaction
frictions, frequently modeled including real balances in the utility function or assuming cash-in-advance
constraint, equilibrium relations are direct generalizations of those for the cashless economy. However,
since its quantitative results are not too di⁄erent if monetary frictions are parameterized in an empirically
plausible way, a cashless analysis is a useful simpli￿cation.
42.1 Households
In real world, purchasing decisions of great part of goods, as durables, are su¢ ciently sparse
to allow enough time to gather price information before purchases are actually concluded.
Thus traditional assumptions stating that consumers know all the prices before consuming is
quite a good description of reality. Such an economic decision is exhaustively modeled and its
consequences are well understood.
But there are situations in which such a premise does not work so well. Consumers fre-
quently face the following recurrent questions: which shopping mall should I choose? Or which
supermarket? People￿ s habitual behavior is to choose a supermarket before knowing the actual
prices, only e⁄ectively known when walking through its rows. And doing so, empirical evidence
points that after choosing a place to buy, consumers restrict their purchasing decisions only to
the goods found in the elected market.
Therefore, the following question arises: how to incorporate such a decision pattern in formal
analytical models? And what are the consequent optimal agents decisions?
In an e⁄ort to answer such a question, we assume the existence of several complete markets,
or consumption centers (Cj, henceforth), indexed by j. In each one, monopolist ￿rms i hire
specialized labor force hj;t (i) at nominal wage wj;t (i) and produce di⁄erentiated goods i. As
usual, we assume that i 2 (0;1) in a unit mass continuum and that individual ￿rm￿ s decisions
have no in￿ uence on wages. Each market is then characterized by monopolistic competition.
We also assume that ￿rms are subjected to exogenous cost shocks, formalized further on, but
none of them are subjected to price adjustment costs.
Here, we consider markets transacting non-durable goods, so that the purchase decisions
happen with high frequency3. Given the great number of goods and given the decision frequency,
it is not reasonable to consider that consumers are informed of all the prices prior to each
period market choices. Not because of information cost, but due to the fact that the period
length between consecutive consumption decisions is lower than the necessary to memorize
make optimal decisions based on the huge information set4.
Therefore, the above consideration leads us to assume that the consumers￿buying decision
is based on historical data on prices. In other words, we assume that the consumers know the
historical average pricing strategy adopted by each ￿rm. In general, this information can be
summarized by indexes such as price averages, price volatility and so on.
Even though it seems to be a strong assumption, it captures the observed consumers be-
havioral pattern previously exempli￿ed. For illustrative purposes, we can take the traditional
grocery shops as examples of our model￿ s consumption centers. Each item5 is su¢ ciently dif-
ferentiated and they all are diversi￿ed. Another example would be the set of large shopping
malls, which gather several di⁄erentiated ￿rms.
For simpli￿cation purposes, we build a model in an environment with only two consumption
centers6. Due to such considerations, we make the model￿ s primary assumption:
Assumption 1 In every period, preceding the choice of a consumption center, only historical
price patterns are households common knowledge. Hence, they choose a consumption center
3Hence, the model is not proposed to explain the whole economy, but only speci￿c sectors.
4Even with computer assistance to ￿nd which ￿rms are cheaper, time would still be an issue, due to the
length of time required by price researches to catalog and release price information.
5Since the model assumes an in￿nite number of agents, one may argue that the real world ￿nite number
of agents may ￿ aw the model results. Nevertheless, a known result of Debreu (1975) states that a Walras
equilibrium convergence rate to the core, in regular economies, is of order O(1/n). Since Walras equilibria have
a ￿nite number of agents in spite of the in￿nite number of agents of the core, one may conjecture that the
problem concerning the number agents may be minimized at least as fast as the actual number of agents.
6However, the analytical treatment and results can be easily expanded for the case of several consumption
centers.
5before they have the information about the prevailing prices of the chosen center. Once this
choice is made, their consumption decisions are restricted to the chosen market.
Furthermore, it is important to make use of some tools from game theory, in particular
some concepts and their rationale, for they explicitly handle the agents￿rationality. Indeed, the
microfounded macroeconomic rational expectations equilibrium concept have their peer in game
theory sub-game perfect equilibrium concept, for embedding the same rationale of backward
inductions methodological algorithm: rational expectations optimal decisions in period t are
agents￿best responses, given the best responses to be made in the future.
Under certain assumptions, described in Woodford (2003), we may use the concept of a
representative household. In order to characterize its preferences, we de￿ne u(￿) and ￿ (￿)
denoting the consumption utility and labor disutility respectively7. It is convenient to make
some regularity assumptions:
Assumption 2 The domains of u(￿) and ￿ (￿) are strictly positive8, in other words u;￿ :
(0;+1) ! R.
Assumption 3 The function consumption utility u(￿) is increasing in consumption, strictly
concave, and its third derivative satis￿es uCCC (￿) > 0 in its domain. Furthermore, the function
labor disutility ￿ (￿) is increasing in labor and strictly convex in its domain.
According to Assumption 1, consumption decisions are restricted to the chosen Cj. There-
fore, we may aggregate consumption in such a consumption center considering the Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) standard way, which assumes a constant elasticity of substitution ￿ > 1 among
the di⁄erentiated transitioned goods, as shown in equation (1) below, where cj;t (i) indicates









; 8j 2 f1;2g (1)
In each period t, after choosing a particular Cj, households gets the instantaneous consump-
tion utility u(Cj;t), e.g. no matter how Cj;t is distributed among each good i from Cj, only the
aggregate consumption in the consumption center is important in terms of preference issues9.
One can easily derive10 the hicksian demand function of good i from Cj and an expression
for the aggregate price Pj;t in each consumption center, as shown in (2) and (3), below.














Where Pj;t satis￿es Pj;tCj;t =
R 1
0 pj;t (i)cj;t (i)di.
7Note that they are not subject to preference shocks, as in traditional literature. Also, we assume further
on the absence of technology shocks in the production function. Such assumptions aim only to simplify the
analysis allowing us to better understand the consequences of ine¢ cient time-varying exogenous shocks hitting
￿rms￿marginal costs, formally introduced in subsection 2.2. And due to this last disturbance source, the model
distinguishes the concepts of natural and steady state products, formally de￿ned in subsection 2.2.1.
8Economic modeling usually assumes that equilibrium consumption and labor force are not zero. Therefore,
such an assumption does not restrict the model results.
9Such an assumption is very in line with the one adopted in recent literature.
10Similar results are standard in recent literature, so the analytical derivation is not shown here.
6In order to capture either deterministic or stochastic (randomizations) choices among each
consumption center, de￿ne ￿ as the probability11 of choosing the consumption centar C1. This
modeling procedure allows, in turn, to capture deterministic choices by ￿ = 0 or ￿ = 1, as the
events in which the household always chooses C1 or C2, respectively. Moreover, this probabilistic
treatment allows for possible randomizations, without the need of modifying the corresponding
expressions.
As a consequence of Assumption 1, the choice of the consumption center can be interpreted
as a choice among lotteries, with the corresponding pay o⁄￿ s depending on the prevailing prices
found at the chosen center. Hence, the aggregate consumption Ct from both consumption
centers must satisfy the equality (4), e.g. Ct is the equivalent consumption, under absence of
uncertainty on the lottery choice, which generates the same utility level as the one measured
by the expected utility. However, Ct is not a certainty equivalent aggregate consumption, for
it is still a random variable due either to the uncertainty regarding the prices found in each
consumption center and to the other random variables present in the model economy.
u(Ct) = E￿u(Cj;t) = ￿ ￿ u(C1;t) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ u(C2;t) (4)
For simpli￿cation sake, we assume as well that the representative household supply labor
only at the chosen consumption center Cj. Thus we aggregate the labor force hj;t (i) supplied in
each Cj to produce good i by the same way we did with the aggregate consumption, for there
are similar uncertainties as the previous considered ones. Therefore we aggregate the amount
of labor force as indicated below in equation (5).
￿ (ht (i)) = ￿ ￿ ￿ (h1;t (i)) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (h2;t (i)) (5)
We may now de￿ne Pt and wt (i) denoting the aggregate price and the aggregate wage of
labor force of type i among all consumption centers in period t, respectively, satisfying the
following relations:
PtCt = ￿ ￿ P1;tC1;t + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ P2;tC2;t (6)
wt (i)ht (i) = ￿ ￿ w1;t (i)h1;t (i) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ w2;t (i)h2;t (i) (7)
As standard, we assume that ￿nancial assets are evenly shared among all households in
period zero, so complete markets imply in identical budget restrictions for every household.
Moreover, de￿ne Wt as the nominal ￿nancial wealth held by the household in the beginning of
period t, Qt;t+1 as the stochastic discounting factor that must exist under absence of arbitrage,
￿ as the preference intertemporal discounting factor, it is the nominal interest rate satisfying
(1 + it)




Regarding the representative household, note that after choosing a Cj in each period t,
the prevailing prices of the chosen center are known. However, expectations regarding future
consumption and prices are summarized by C￿ and P￿, for 8￿ > t, for the future choices on
consumption centers are still lottery choices. Hence, the household problem can be formally
represented by (8) and its solution depends on the non-ponzi constraint (9).

















0 ￿ (h￿ (i))di
￿
s:t:
Pj;tCj;t + E￿ [Qt;t+1Wt+1] ￿ Wt +
R 1
0 (wj;t (i)hj;t (i) + ￿t (i))di
P￿C￿ + E￿ [Q￿;￿+1W￿+1] ￿ W￿ +
R 1











(w￿ (i)h￿ (i) + ￿￿ (i))di
￿
￿ 0 (9)
Denote by Yj;t and Yt aggregate production levels to be further discussed. Considering that
all production must be consumed in equilibrium for every period, e.g. Cj;t = Yj;t and Ct = Yt,



















, 8￿ > t (11)










Purging equations (10) and (12), we present the new generalized Euler equation (13) asso-


















The last results lead us to an interesting interpretation. Even after the choice of a consump-
tion center, the expectations about future aggregate consumption and prices do not change and
are the same as the ones prevailing just before that choice. Furthermore the rationale of optimal
current consumption planning, as a function of current aggregate price, remain unchanged even
after the choice of a center.
Considering the rationale of backward induction, since households actually know they will
optimally behave in period t + 1, optimal decisions in period t are made assuming that the
expectation term at the right hand side of (13) is given. It means that such a term do not
depend on contemporaneous decisions12. Therefore, we state the following remark:
12Such a conclusion is standard and is simply a consequence of the Euler equation, for it implies that contem-
poraneous decisions depend only on the expectation concerning the future, not the past. Therefore, expectations
on future optimal choices are not a⁄ected by contemporaneous decisions. If instead households had habit per-
sistence as in some modeling approaches, contemporaneus consumption decisions would depend on the past,
implying that expectations on future optimal choices would be a⁄ected by contemporaneous decisions.
8Remark 1 The expectation term at the right hand side of the previously depicted consumption
generalized Euler equation is not a function of contemporaneous decisions.
Another important ￿rst order condition that solves the problem (8) is the expression (15)


















As usual in this type of modeling, we assume that each ￿rm is specialized in the production
of a unique good i, holding monopoly of its production, in an environment of monopolistic
competition. Furthermore, the only input of each ￿rm is the specialized labor force. In addition,
some other simplifying assumptions are made13.
Assumption 4 Firm are price takers, regarding the nominal wage wj;t (i), in the labor market.
Assumption 5 Even though there is a committed price in each period, if there is no demand
for a good i, the ￿rm i will make no expenses.
We assume a ￿just in time￿process of inputs supplying, so that the elapsed time between
producing and supplying is negligible. Therefore, ￿rms do not need to anticipate the production
decision, e.g. yj;t (i) = cj;t (i), 8j 2 f1;2g and 8t ￿ 0.
Assumption 6 There is a stochastic process, de￿ned further on, that hits on the ￿rm￿ s cost
functions.
Assumption 7 There is a steady state14 level for prices15, namely P. However, the distribution
of the stochastic process generating the exogenous shocks can vary.
Thus, if such a shock term follows an autoregressive process it is possible that prices remain
above, or below, its stationary level for an arbitrarily long length of time, allowing for persistent
in￿ ation. However, the assumption on P implies that in￿ ationary periods will be followed by
de￿ ationary ones.
Assumption 8 The unconditional distribution of all the random variables considered in this
model economy is time stationary.
Before presenting our equilibrium analysis, we formally characterize the outcomes of three
types of possible environments: (a) the standard ￿ exible price environment, for the outcomes
under most price equilibria are better understood when compared with the former; (b) the
e¢ cient producing and the steady state producing environments; and (c) the standard sticky
price environment. In the latter environment, we show some useful results in order to conduct
our equilibrium analysis. In particular, we show that the unconditionally expected pro￿ts of
competing ￿rms under a standard sticky price environment decreases with the degree of price
rigidity.
13Such simplifying assumptions can be weakened in future extensions.
14We de￿ne the steady state as the equilibrium environment that would occur if all exogenous random variables
remain ￿xed in their expected values.
15Such an assumption is not too strong, since several works in the literature concludes that the optimal
monetary policy rule is to target a ￿xed price level. Moreover, our model conclusions are consistent with such
an assumption.
92.2.1 Flexible prices
Let Costj;t (i) be the total cost of ￿rm i from Cj in the period t. Since the produced good is
di⁄erentiated, and given the assumption that, once a consumption center is chosen, households
cannot go to another one until the next period, the ￿rm i is subject to monopolistic competition.
Let then ￿j be the consumer￿ s probability of choosing Cj, e.g. ￿1 = ￿ and ￿2 = 1￿￿. With
such a notation, we formalize the problem of the ￿rm i from Cj as to maximize its expected
pro￿t in each period subject to the demand curve (2), e.g.
max
fpj;t(i)g
￿j;t (i) = ￿j [pj;t (i)yj;t (i) ￿ Costj;t (i)]





Optimal solution implies that p￿
j;t (i) is determined with a markup ￿ over the nominal
marginal cost S"
j;t (i), as expected due to the monopolistic competition environment, e.g.
p
￿






@yj;t(i) and ￿ = ￿
￿￿1 > 1.
We assume that each ￿rm i from Cj have that same production function as shown in (19),
so that its only input is the labor force hj;t (i).
yj;t (i) = Af (hj;t (i)) (19)
Where the parameter A denotes the average production technology used by ￿rms from all
consumption centers, and f (￿) satis￿es the following assumptions:
Assumption 9 The domain of f (￿) is strictly positive.
Assumption 10 The function f (￿) is strictly increasing in labor force and strictly concave.
We assume that each ￿rm faces a total cost function represented in (20) below.
Costj;t (i) = wj;t (i)hj;t (i) + yj;t (i)Pj;t ￿ "t (20)
Where "t is a time-varying exogenous shock such that:


















Since ￿rms are price takers in labor market, we may derive the following expression for
sj;t (i) considering the equations for real wages (15) and for the production function (19):
sj;t (i) = s(yj;t (i);Yj;t) =








Note that we may represent the real marginal cost s"
j;t (i) as follows:
s
" (yj;t (i);Yj;t;"t) = s(yj;t (i);Yj;t) + "t (23)








Note that given the regularity properties of preferences and production function, all ￿rms
from every consumption center optimally choose the same production level in a ￿ exible price
equilibrium, which must equal the aggregate production, e.g. yj;t (i) = Yt. Moreover, given the
demand equation (2), they all choose the same optimal price, which must equal the aggregate
price in Cj, e.g. p￿
j;t (i) = P ￿
j;t. Moreover, due to the symmetry among the consumption centers,
it is not di¢ cult to verify that P ￿
1;t = P ￿
2;t = P ￿
t . So we state the following de￿nitions:
De￿nition 1 The (time-varying) natural product Y n
t , the equilibrium aggregate production level
prevailing in all consumption centers under a fully ￿exible prices environment, is implicitly






t ;"t) = 1 (24)
De￿nition 1 implies a money neutrality regarding the natural product, for it is independent
on monetary policy. Furthermore, considering the above equation (23) we may rewrite (24)
as follows and conclude that the exogenous shock is a very relevant variable, for it determines
a time-varying markup ￿t applied over the nominal labor marginal cost under a ￿ exible price

















Where ￿t = (￿￿1 ￿ "t)
￿1.
2.2.2 E¢ cient and steady state productions
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in a given period t. It is easy to conclude that the
￿rst order condition satis￿es the following equation. Due to the absence of any time-varying
term, the e¢ cient production shall be time-invariant.





Note that the left hand side of the previous result is an equivalent representation of the real
labor marginal cost sj;t (i) evaluated in the e¢ cient level of production. Therefore, we state the
following de￿nition.
De￿nition 2 The (time-invariant) e¢ cient product Y e, the equilibrium aggregate production




e) = 1 (26)
11Comparing equations (25) and (26), we conclude that Y n
t equals Y e only if (￿￿1 ￿ "t) = 1,
e.g. in an event of measure zero for practical purposes. Thus, it is expected the natural product
to be ine¢ cient in general16.
Regarding the steady state production level, one easily shows that it must satisfy the fol-
lowing de￿nition:
De￿nition 3 The steady state product Y , the equilibrium aggregate production level prevailing
in all consumption centers if the shock term "t remains ￿xed in its mean " in all periods, is










= (￿￿1 ￿ "), the e¢ ciency of the steady state
product depends on the value of the parameter ". As standard, we assess its ine¢ ciency degree
considering the parameter ￿y ￿ 1, implicitly de￿ned as follows, so that the steady state product





= 1 ￿ ￿y
Considering our model features, the ine¢ ciency degree parameter ￿y may be de￿ned as in
(28) below.






Note that our model has possibly two sources of ine¢ ciency: (a) the monopolistic power
of ￿rms, captured by the price markup ￿; and (b) the cost shock, captured by its average ".
Therefore, in order to correct the ine¢ ciency sources and make Y e¢ cient the model economy
needs a time-varying subsidy, for ￿y = 0 if and only if "ef = ￿￿
￿1 < 0, e.g. the cost shock
must actually be a subsidy averaging the inverse of the elasticity of substitution among the
di⁄erentiated goods.
2.2.3 Sticky prices
Consider the standard assumption in which a particular ￿rm adjusts its price in period t with
the timeless probability (1 ￿ ￿), within the staggered pricesetting framework of Calvo￿ s (1983)
nominal rigidity structure. Denote by ￿ pj;t (i) the new price if the ￿rm adjusts in period t. Thus
the probability ￿ of not readjusting is the ￿rm￿ s measure of price stickiness. Note that the
situation in which the ￿rm always chooses ￿ exible prices is modeled by ￿ = 0.
Therefore, considering that some properties of uniform convergence apply, the ￿rm￿ s ex-
pected sum of pro￿t ￿ ow ￿d
j;0 (i) discounted at period t = 0 may be represented as in (29) for
￿ < 1. Details are in Appendix A.2.
￿
d




















16Thus, our time varying exogenous shock generates ine¢ ciencies in the same way the standard time varying
nominal income tax does.
12￿(pj;t (i);Pj;T;Yj;T;wj;T (i);￿
"
T) = pj;t (i)yj;T (i) ￿ [wj;T (i)hj;T (i) + yj;T (i)Pj;T ￿ "T]






t=0 that maximize (29) given its demand equation (2). Note that such a
problem is separable into several independent simpler problems like (30), one for each branch
on the possibility tree, depicted in Figure 4 of Appendix A.2, regarding the event ￿the ￿rm






￿j￿T￿tQt;T￿(￿ pj;t (i);Pj;T;Yj;T;wj;T (i);￿
"
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Note that the optimal price p￿
j;t (i) is a continuous function17 of ￿, e.g. p￿
j;t (i) = p￿
j;t (￿).
From now on we assess some properties of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t ￿ ow value-function ￿￿
j (￿), the pro￿t






In the equilibrium analysis conducted in next section, we search for an equilibrium in which
￿rms optimally decide a timeless18 price rigidity degree to be maintained in all periods, e.g.
￿rms decide on the stickiness degree before knowing the future realizations of random variables.
Hence, such decisions must be based on unconditional expectations.
Note that the cost shock may lead to negative pro￿ts in some periods. Therefore, we
state the following assumption on the necessary condition of market existence, where E￿"￿￿
j (￿)
denotes the unconditional expected value, in ￿
", of ￿￿
j (￿).
Assumption 11 If the ￿rm i from Cj is present in the market then there exists a non-zero
probability measure for the households to choose this market, e.g. ￿j > 0, and its unconditional
expected pro￿t ￿ow E￿"￿￿
j (￿) is a continuous and non-negative function of ￿.
Moreover, one easily conjectures that a particular ￿rm maximizes ￿￿
j (￿) when choosing a
￿ exible price strategy, e.g. ￿ = 0, for its expected pro￿t ￿j;t (i) is maximized period-to-period
as previously shown in (17). Thus E￿"￿￿
j (￿) is also optimized when ￿ = 0. Since higher values
17Given the assumed regularity hypothesis regarding the functions at hand, the ￿rst order condition (31)
implicitly de￿nes an unique solution p￿
j;t (i).
18Under such a timeless perspective, we mean that a particular ￿rm has always chosen the same price stickiness
degree ￿, and has always behaved the same way, even before the initial period t = 0. Such a time consistent
approach is standard and "tastes" like the Woodford￿ s (2003) strategy in deriving the time consistent optimal
monetary rules.
13of ￿ imply in stronger restrictions19 to the ￿rm￿ s optimization problem (30), one expects that
E￿"￿￿
j (￿) is a decreasing function of its argument. The following statement formalizes such a
conjecture:
Proposition 1 Under a timeless perspective, if a particular ￿rm i from Cj is present in the
market then its expected pro￿t E￿"￿￿
j (￿) is a decreasing function of the degree of nominal price
rigidity summarized by the probability ￿.
The proof is given in Appendix A.3.
Corollary 1 If a particular ￿rm i is present in the market then E￿"￿￿
j (0) ￿ 0.
The proof is straightforward once E￿"￿￿
j (0) ￿ E￿"￿￿
j (￿), 8￿ 2 [0;1].
We next assess the case in which the ￿rm adopts the probability ￿ of price stickiness, but
when adjusting the ￿rm decides instead for the sub-optimal price20 p￿
j;t (￿ ￿), where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.
Such a case is relevant, for we consider it when testing best responses in the further discussed
equilibrium analysis.
In such a context, we de￿ne ￿d
j (￿;p￿ (￿ ￿)) as the pro￿t ￿ ow function of a ￿rm that readjusts




t=0, where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. Formally, ￿d




























Now, we make the following statement:
Proposition 2 Under a timeless perspective, suppose that the i-th ￿rm from Cj is present in
the market and adopts the probability ￿ of price stickiness, but when adjusting it decides instead
for the sub-optimal price p￿
j;t (￿ ￿), where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. In such a context the unconditional expectance
of ￿d




￿ (￿ ￿)) ￿ E￿"￿
￿
j (￿ ￿) for ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (33)
The proof is given in Appendix A.4.
Therefore, a pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm that optimally readjust its price with probability (1 ￿ ￿ ￿)
have its expected pro￿t decreased when increasing its price stickiness degree to ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ even











We next search for a particular equilibrium in which all ￿rms of a particular consumption
center endogenously choose the same time-invariant price stickiness degree. Such an equilibrium
is interesting for the standard literature assumes that all ￿rms are identical regarding their
exogenously given nominal price rigidity degree, even if no adjusting costs apply. Our approach
leads to an endogenous price stickiness degree as an optimal strategy of competing ￿rms. We
stress the fact that such a result follows from the traditionally assumed consumer risk aversion,
so it applies even in an economy where ￿rms have no adjusting costs.
19Since prices remain ￿xed for about ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) periods, on average, the restriction works almost as if higher
values of ￿ ￿increased￿the number of restrictions of the type ￿pj;t (i) = pj;t￿1 (i)￿ .
20Note that p￿
j;t (￿ ￿) would be the optimal price if the ￿rm adjusted with probability (1 ￿ ￿ ￿) instead.
142.3 The equilibrium
In line with the former assumption on distributions stationarity, we focus our analysis in search-
ing for equilibrium outcomes in which agents￿decisions are also time stationary regarding the
￿rms￿choices on the degree of price stickiness. Although there should be other equilibria with
idiosyncratic time-varying parameter ￿j;t (i), our choice for such a speci￿c equilibrium simpli￿es
our analysis while still allowing for a broadening of the understanding of the sources of nominal
rigidities. Moreover, such an equilibrium is in line with the basic standard approach in which
the degree of nominal rigidity is time-invariant.
In order to simplify the argument, we may consider that a coalition is formed among all
the ￿rms from each Cj, so that they all decide to adopt the same degree ￿j of price stickiness.
Such coalition is formed for long-run reputation purposes, and its plausibility depends on a
mechanism that penalizes each ￿rm that refuses to adopt the group strategy. Indeed, consider
the case in which no penalizing mechanism is created. Since every ￿rm knows that its strategy
has no in￿ uence over aggregate variables, they will choose the ￿free rider￿￿ exible price strategy,
for it maximizes their individual pro￿ts. Thus the existence of such a coalition depends on the
penalizing mechanism. However such a coalition strategy permits a competitive advantage over
the strategies adopted by the ￿rms from the other consumption center, as will be shown further
on. Therefore such a coalition assumption is not so strong. We abstract from issues concerning
the coalition, such as the coalition central planner, and focus on its consequences.
Formalizing our arguments we de￿ne the equilibrium we search for:
De￿nition 4 The equilibrium of the above model economy consists on a set of dynamic equa-
tions characterizing the agents optimal behavior and a set of endogenously determined probabil-
ity measures, such as the timeless degrees of nominal rigidity ￿j adopted by each Cj, and also
the timeless probabilities ￿j of choosing Cj, both consistent with the agents solutions to their
inter-temporal maximization problem.
Note that the previous de￿nition implies that all the ￿rms, from the same Cj, that readjust
prices in period t choose the same optimal price p￿
t (￿j). Note that the optimal price ultimately
depends only on the chosen price stickiness degree, so if both consumption centers choose
￿1 = ￿2 = ￿, every ￿rm that optimize in period t choose the same optimal price p￿
t (￿),
regardless the consumption center they belong to. However, if the consumption centers adopt
di⁄erent degrees of price stickiness, e.g. in case of ￿1 6= ￿2, the readjusted prices will di⁄er
from center to center.













An interesting feature of our modelling assumptions is that once chosen the consumption
center, everything tends to mimic the standard models in the literature, at least until the
following period.
Before presenting the next proposition, which states that the representative household￿ s
instantaneous utility function21 is concave in prices, we need some lemmas22 regarding the
following functions:
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22Since their proofs are easy and purely algebraic, we omit them.
15￿u : R++ ! R (35)








￿￿ : R++ ! R (36)











Where k > 0 and K > 0.
Lemma 1 The previously de￿ned function ￿u (￿) is strictly concave.
Lemma 2 If the consumption utility function satis￿es the following restriction, e.g. if the





+ ￿(2￿ ￿ 1)￿
￿1
r ({) > 3￿ (37)
Where ￿ ({) = ￿
uCCC({)
uCC({) > 0 is the Absolute Prudence Index23, ￿￿1
a ({) = ￿
uCC({)
uC({) > 0 is the
Absolute Risk Aversion Index and ￿￿1
r ({) = ￿
uCC({)￿{
uC({) > 0 is the Relative Risk Aversion Index
for { > 0.
At a ￿rst glance the restriction (37) seems to be very strong. However in the case of the
widely used Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions24, the parameters locus
satisfying such a restriction is quite wide. Note that the narrow gray area of Figure 1, depicted
in Appendix A.1, indicates the tinny region where (37) is not satis￿ed.
It is important to stress that such a restriction is just a su¢ cient condition for the Lemma
2 to hold. The necessary and su¢ cient condition also includes labor disutility and production
function parameters. Since its interpretation is less intuitive we did not present it. However
such a new restriction narrows the gray area of Figure 1, making even wider the acceptance
area where ￿￿ (￿) is strictly convex in the case of the CRRA utility functions.
Now we are able to announce and prove an important proposition stating that a best
response of the ￿rms from one consumption center is to increase the degree of price stickiness
relatively to the one adopted by the ￿rms from the other consumption center.
Proposition 3 Provided that restriction (37) is satis￿ed and that E￿"￿￿
1 (0) > 0, suppose that
the households always choose the C1, e.g. ￿1 = 1 and ￿2 = 0. Therefore, there is a small
enough probability ￿2 > 0 such that if the ￿rms from C2 announce the following price setting




t (0) , with probability (1 ￿ ￿2)
p2;t￿1 (i) , with probability ￿2
(38)
then all households realize that they have better changing their strategies to ￿ ￿1 = 0 and ￿ ￿2 = 1,
bene￿ting the ￿rms from C2.
23Its usual to consider the Absolute Prudence Index in economic analysis in which agents make optimal
choices in an inter-temporal decision environment with uncertainties. A good reference is Kimball (1990).
24For CRRA utility functions as u(c) = c
1￿￿￿1
￿1
1￿￿￿1 , with a constant relative risk aversion index ￿￿1, the
absolute index of risk aversion and prudence are ￿￿1




So, the inequality (37) can be simpli￿ed to ￿(2￿ ￿ 1)￿￿2 + (1 ￿ 3￿)￿￿1 + 1 > 0, whose solution set is: n
￿￿1 2 R : ￿￿1 < 1




16The proof is given in Appendix A.5.
Based on the above arguments, we are able to formalize the characterization of the equilib-
rium concept from the households￿behavior standpoint, as the next theorem assesses.
Theorem 1 Provided that restriction (37) is satis￿ed and that E￿"￿￿
j (0) > 0, there is no
equilibrium in which the representative household always chooses the same consumption center.
Therefore, under such assumptions, households are indi⁄erent between consumption centers in
equilibrium.
The proof is given in Appendix A.6.
Now, turning our attention to the ￿rms behavior, the next theorem assess that ￿rms choose
the equilibrium degree of nominal rigidity ￿eq as the highest degree of price stickiness consistent
with a non-negative expected pro￿t. Therefore such a theorem constitutes the key result of the
present study.
Theorem 2 Provided that households are su¢ ciently prudent and risk averse, according to the
inequality (37) of above Lemma 2 and that E￿"￿￿
j (0) ￿ 0, equilibrium requires that all ￿rms
from both consumption centers adopt the same highest degree of price stickiness ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿eq,
for which the expected pro￿t is non-negative, e.g. E￿"￿￿
j (￿eq) ￿ 0, 8j. Non-trivial solutions
implies E￿"￿￿
j (￿eq) = 0, 8j. Otherwise, if E￿"￿￿
j (1) ￿ 0 then ￿eq = 1 represents the trivial
solution25.
The proof is given in Appendix A.7.
Therefore, the above theorem implicitly de￿nes the equilibrium stating that E￿"￿￿
j (￿eq) = 0,
8j in the non-trivial case.
Note that it has a Bertrand equilibrium ￿ avor. However, instead of competition on prices per
se as in the Bertrand case, the equilibrium at hand considers a competition on the parameter
capturing the degree of price rigidity.
It is interesting to note that such a result follows from the two types of competition inputted
in the model. The ￿rst one is the traditional monopolistic competition that allows each ￿rm
to choose an optimal price that maximizes its expected discounted pro￿t ￿ ow. The second
one is the contribution of our modelling assumption on consumption centers. Indeed in the
￿rst decision moment of each period t, households must decide from two "identical goods",
namely the homogeneous consumption centers. Therefore, a oligopoly game must apply to
model competition among both consumption centers. Since such a competition is conducted
in terms of the degree of price stickiness, the Bertrand game captured the strategic behavior.
As a consequence, the expected discounted pro￿t ￿ ows turned to be zero in the non-trivial
equilibrium, despite the fact they are the best ￿rms can make optimally choosing their individual
prices.
In order to close this section, three comments are in order. The ￿rst one concern the number
of consumption centers in the model economy. In spite of adopting only two consumption
centers in the above economy, the obtained results can be easily extended to a larger number
of consumption centers.
The second one refers to the fact that the above theorem generalizes the perfect competitive
equilibrium result of zero pro￿ts. Theorem 2 states that such a pro￿t is zero on average or in
expected terms.
The third one is based on Proposition 3. The uncertainty regarding the exogenous shock
"t, which does not a⁄ect the households￿preferences neither the ￿rms￿productivity, make
households postpone the ￿ exible prices environment.
25Note that if E￿"￿￿
j (1) < 0, 8j then there is no equilibrium, for there are no ￿rms in the market.
17Such a result is achieved from the fact that the expected utility decreases with the uncer-
tainty regarding the ￿ exible prices environment. We showed that a sticky price environment,
at least a Calvo￿ s type one, is preferred to the one with ￿ exible prices. However it is important
to point out that we did not proved that households prefer the Calvo￿ s type nominal rigid-
ity the most. It is possible that other price ￿ltering procedures may also reduce the implied
uncertainty, and we suggest that approach as future extensions.
Note that E￿"￿￿




the non-trivial equilibrium condition E￿"￿￿
j (￿eq) = 0 implies that he endogenous degree of
price stickiness ￿eq depends on the distributions of aggregate price and production. But such
distributions surely depend on the way monetary policy is conducted, for it determines the
expected path of aggregate variables. Therefore the Lucas￿critique may be applied, for changes
on the way monetary policy is conducted may lead to changes in the endogenous degree of price
stickiness and in the coe¢ cients of structural equations.
Moreover, we expect that the equilibrium price rigidity would depend on the distribution
of the exogenous shock, so structural breaks in the stochastic process of "t a⁄ect ￿eq.
Therefore, we could extend the concept behind the Lucas￿critique. The dependency of the
degree of price rigidity on the distribution of the exogenous cost shock strongly suggests that
the traditional monetary policy evaluation exercises using macroeconometric models could be
￿ awed. Typically estimated relations, even with quasi-structural equations, containing future
expectations derived with an ad hoc imposed nominal rigidity source, are reduced-form rather
than truly structural relations, for structural changes in the stochastic process generating the
cost shocks can change the optimal degree of price stickiness chosen by the ￿rms.
Therefore, as a policy-oriented implication of the present study we recommend the utilization
of econometric models with time-varying parameters in order to assess possible parameters
structural breaks even if the implemented policy remains unchanged.
In the following section, we introduce the model￿ s ￿rst and second order approximations for
the corresponding structural equations. Among other results, we show that: (a) the degree of
ine¢ ciency ￿y constitutes a source of nominal price rigidity; and (b) the equilibrium (optimal)
degree of price rigidity ￿eq depends on the coe¢ cient of variation of the random shock "t, for
a given monetary policy rule.
3 Log-approximated structural equations
Initially, it is convenient to derive log-approximations for aggregate product and prices through
the consumption centers, adopting the following notation as the percentage deviation of each
variable from its steady state value. For any variable {t, always positive or negative, with a
steady state value ￿ {, we de￿ne ^ {t ￿ log({t=￿ {).
It is easy to verify that the expressions (4) and (6) imply the following ￿rst order Taylor
approximations:
b Yt = ￿b Y1;t + (1 ￿ ￿) b Y2;t (39)
b Pt = ￿ b P1;t + (1 ￿ ￿) b P2;t (40)
Moreover, from (24) and (26), we log-linearize the natural and the e¢ cient26 products as
follows:
26If ￿y is close enough to zero, the approximated log-deviation of the e¢ cient production from the steady
state product turns into b Y e = ￿y
￿
! + ￿￿1￿￿1
















Where ￿y is the previously de￿ned ine¢ ciency degree parameter and ￿ denotes the time-
invariant probability of choosing the C1, e.g. ￿ = ￿1.
Assuming that the distribution support of "t is completely inside R+ or R￿, we obtain the
















￿1￿ b Yt + ￿￿ " b "t (43)








s(Y ;Y) Y , ￿￿1 ￿ ￿
uCC(Y)
uC(Y) Y is the steady state relative risk
aversion index, and b s "
t ￿ ￿b s "
1;t + (1 ￿ ￿)b s "
2;t aggregates the real marginal costs from each
consumption center.
In turn, we may relate the aggregate real marginal cost to the output gap xt ￿
￿













Finally, the time-varying markup can be log-linearized as shown below. Note that b ￿t is
proportional to b Y n




￿￿1￿ " b "t (45)
3.1 The structural aggregate supply curve
Log-linearizing the ￿rst order condition (31) from the ￿rms￿problem under price stickiness, we
obtain the following New-Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC):
￿t = ￿ xt + ￿Et￿t+1 (46)
Where ￿ ￿ ￿￿y ￿
(1￿￿eq)(1￿￿eq￿)
￿eq ￿ ￿ , ￿￿y ￿
￿(1￿￿y)(1+!￿)
1+￿(1￿￿y)!￿ and ￿ ￿ !+￿￿1
1+!￿ .
The term ￿ is well known in the literature and is related to the degree of strategic comple-
mentarity between ￿rms￿price setting decisions. If ￿ is low enough, the aggregate price tends
to be more sticky even when a great fraction of ￿rms adjust their prices more often.
Note now that the friction captured by the ine¢ ciency degree also a⁄ects the nominal price





. Hence we argue that, in our set up, such a friction works also as a source
for price rigidity.
193.1.1 Welfare and cost push shocks
Under certain conditions27 it can be shown that in order to maximize the welfare of the repre-















Where the parameters ￿ > 0 and ￿ ￿ 0 are based on the deep parameters of the economy.
More speci￿cally ￿ ￿ ￿
￿, where ￿ is the coe¢ cient associated with output in the NKPC and ￿
represents the elasticity of substitution between goods in the economy.
Note that the monetary authority must also concern about dispersions of the aggregate
production from its e¢ cient level rather than from the steady state level, e.g. e xt ￿ ^ Yt is the
relevant concept of output gap for monetary policy issues.
Thus we may rewrite the NKPC in terms of e xt rather than xt as follows, implying a cost
push shock term related to the exogenous cost shock term b "t:
￿t = ￿ e xt + ￿Et￿t+1 + ut (48)
Where e xt ￿ b Yt, ut ￿ ￿
(!+￿￿1)b ￿t and b ￿t =
￿
1 ￿ ￿y
￿￿1￿ " b "t.






￿￿ " E￿"b "t (49)
3.2 The endogenous degree of price stickiness
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0(h)h is an additional parameter that represents the steady state concavity




Therefore, as a consequence of log-linearizing the necessary condition of a non-trivial equi-
librium, e.g. E￿"￿￿
j (￿eq) = 0, 8j, the following equality must hold:
￿

















E￿" b Pt = 0 (50)
Note that E￿"b Yt and E￿" b Pt clearly depend on the degree of price stickiness, for it in￿ uences
the equilibrium expected path of aggregate product and price, and on the way monetary policy
27In particular, such an approximation is possible if the steady state product gets close to the e¢ cient product
faster than the ine¢ ciency degree gets close to zero. Since such an approximation is always valid in the case of
￿y = 0, several researches assume a government subsidy amounting the necessary value to o⁄set the remaining
ine¢ ciency sources in their model.
28For an extensive explanation on deriving microfounded welfare based central bank loss functions, see Wood-
ford (2003), chapter 6. Basically, it is a second order Taylor approximation of the welfare function around an
e¢ cient steady state. Its functional form is crucially in￿ uenced by the assumed source of price stickiness.
29See Assumptions 9 and 10.
20is conducted. Since monetary policy conduction varies, there is no unique solution of ￿eq
determined by (50). So the Lucas￿critique may be applied as previously commented.
In the general case, the unconditional expectations of the aggregate variables depend on the
distribution of the exogenous shock "t, for this is the only exogenous random variable. Indeed
we show further on that an optimal monetary policy under a timeless perspective imply that
E￿"b Yt and E￿" b Pt are functions of E￿"b "t. So we expect that the equilibrium price rigidity must
depend on the distribution of the exogenous shock. In other words, structural breaks in the
stochastic process governing the exogenous shock induce changes the (endogenous) degree of
price stickiness chosen by the ￿rms.
Hence, we approximate the ￿rst30 and second31 moments of b "t:
















Note that both the unconditional expectance and variance of b "t can be approximated as
functions of the variation coe¢ cient of "t. For simplicity, let V " denote the variation coe¢ cient
of "t, e.g. V " =
V ar￿""t
￿ "2 .
Note that, given the approximation of E￿"b "t, the unconditional expectance of the cost push
shock ut, shown in (49), is not zero and depends on the volatility of "t. In our approach,
E￿"ut = 0 only if the variation coe¢ cient of "t is zero.
Following the analytical analysis, we turn next to numerically simulate the e⁄ects of a given
monetary policy rule on the endogenous determination of the degree of price stickiness. To this
end, a particular speci￿cation for a monetary policy instance is chosen.
3.2.1 Simulations under a timeless perspective optimal monetary policy rule
For simulation purposes, we consider a particular solution32 of the time consistent optimal
monetary policy approaches shown in Woodford (2003), chap. 7. Adapting for our model at
hand, a particular possible solution satis￿es the following expression:











1 + ￿ + ￿2
￿
￿
￿j + 1 = 0, satisfying 0 < ￿1 < 1 < ￿2.
In order to simplify our analysis, we assume that the cost push shock term evolves according
to an AR(1) process, as follows:
ut = (1 ￿ ￿u)E￿"ut + ￿uut￿1 + ￿t (54)
Where ￿t is i.i.d. with zero mean. Therefore the expected realization of ut+j can be derived
as described below.
Etut+j = E￿"ut + ￿
j
u (ut ￿ E￿"ut)
30Since the function log (￿) is concave, the negative signal was expected.
31The approximation of V ar￿"b "t is also convenient, since it allows for a volatility analysis of each aggregated
variable, as made further on.
32For a more realist simulation, regarding to the empirical features of a particular economy, one must conve-
niently model the way monetary policy is actually conducted by a particular central bank.
21Substituting this result back in (53), we derive a more simpli￿ed expression for E￿" b Pt below.
Note that it does not depend on the persistence parameter ￿u of the stochastic process describing
the cost push shocks.
E￿" b Pt =
￿
￿2E￿"ut
It is easy to verify that the particular monetary policy rule implies that




Thus, from the expression of the unconditional expectance of the cost push shock ut, shown
in (49), we obtain the unconditional expectations on aggregate price and output (percentage
deviations from their respective steady state values) as follows:







￿￿ " E￿"b "t (55)





￿￿ " E￿"b "t (56)
Since the microfounded endogenous parameter ￿ is de￿ned as ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ in the previously shown
central bank loss function, we may simplify the expression for E￿" b Pt as follows:







￿￿ " E￿"b "t (57)
Nevertheless, it is also convenient to use the above result (55) due to the fact that some
central banks chooses a discretionary ￿ ￿ value that penalizes the dispersion of b Yt from b Y e as
shown in the central bank loss function.
Note that if the monetary authority considers the microfounded parameter ￿, output, price
and consequently ￿rms￿pro￿t expectations will not depend on the price rigidity parameter.
Hence, provided a non negative expected pro￿t, ￿rms will choose a total price stickiness, e.g.
￿eq = 1. But such a decision implies that ￿ = 0. Since ￿ ￿ ￿
￿, the only equilibrium occurs
with ￿ = 0. Thus, under such a timeless perspective optimal monetary policy rule, the central
bank will not penalize the aggregate product volatility when choosing a welfare maximizing
criterion. As a result, prices will be completely stabilized while the product dispersion will
have its maximum volatility.
It is important to stress that such a strong conclusion relies: (a) on the Assumption 7
on the existence of a steady state price level ￿ P; and (b) on the assumption on absence of
any preference disturbing shocks. For instance, consider the traditional literature case, with
just one complete market of unit mass, in which households are homogeneous regarding their
preferences, which are subjected to common knowledge disturbing shocks. A traditional result
states that the aggregate price is also a function of such shocks33. Although not formally proved
in our analysis, we can make the conjecture that not ￿ltering the implicit volatility on optimal
prices implied only by such preference shocks would increase the economy welfare, for there is
no household uncertainty concerning this volatility source. As a result, ￿rms would not choose
the maximum price stickiness and ￿eq is likely to be lower. Again, it is a conjecture to be tested
in future extensions.
Returning to our formal analysis, we assess now the usual practice adopted by central banks
to consider a discretionary weight for the aggregate output gap into the loss function, namely
33See Woodford (2003).
22￿ ￿. Therefore E￿" b Pt depends on the price rigidity parameter ￿, as indicated in (46) and (55),
for ￿ is a function of ￿. In such a general case, the parameter ￿eq depends on the volatility of
the exogenous shock E￿"b "t. Following, we show the expected discounted pro￿ts ￿ ow in the case
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￿￿ " E￿"b "t
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(58)
Since Corollary 1 states that E￿"￿￿
j (0) ￿ 0 must hold in order to ￿rms be present in the
market then the following inequality must also hold34.
￿















￿￿ " E￿"b "t ￿ 0 (59)
Therefore, provided the assumptions of Theorem 2, the non-trivial equilibrium condition
E￿"￿￿
j (￿eq) = 0, 8j, implies the following expression for the endogenous degree of nominal
rigidity:
￿eq =
(1 + ￿ + ￿) ￿
q
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￿














￿ " E￿"b "t
(61)
Consider now the most likely case in which ￿ " ￿ 0, e.g. "t is actually a cost. Thus one
can verify35 that ￿eq is a decreasing function of the variation coe¢ cient of "t, e.g V ". In
other words, if positive cost shocks are expected to happen then prices will be more frequently
adjusted in environments where the volatility of "t is high. Moreover, if V " = 0 then the
expected discounted pro￿t ￿ ow is is non-negative and do not depend on ￿eq.
Furthermore, the equilibrium degree of price stickiness ￿eq is a decreasing function of the
discretionary value ￿ ￿. Hence, if the central bank aversion to aggregate product volatility is
lower than the aversion to in￿ ation volatility, as it is the case of many central banks, then the
degree of price stickiness in the economy, as a sub-game perfect equilibrium strategy, must be
high.
In order to numerically simulate the degree of price stickiness, we assume a positive ￿ " value
and adopt a particular Cobb-Douglas type production function speci￿cation:
yj;t (i) = Ahj;t (i)
n (62)
Where n < 1.
With such assumptions, it is easy to verify that the steady state concavity of f (￿) and the
elasticity of the real labor marginal cost for the ￿rms are ￿
￿1
f = (1 ￿ n) and ! = (1 ￿ n)=n,
respectively. Moreover, ￿ " must satisfy 0 < ￿ " < ￿￿1.
34Since lim￿!0 (1=￿) = 0, the result is straightforward.
35Such properties rely on E￿"￿￿
j (￿eq) = 0, E￿"￿￿
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(63)
On the other hand, if ￿￿1 > ￿
￿1
crit then the previous restriction requires that the volatility










[(1 ￿ ￿ ") ￿ n(￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ")]
n￿ "
(64)
Note that V "crit is a strictly decreasing function of ￿￿1 and is such that its lower bound
V "LB






[(1 ￿ ￿ ") ￿ n(￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ")]
n￿ "
(65)
Since our approximations hold for small enough volatility values, the constrain V " ￿ V "crit
shall not be very restrictive.
Base on the above results, we simulate ￿eq as a function of the volatility measure V ",
and of the remaining parameters of the consumption centers economy. These computations
generate the graphics36 depicted in Figures 2 and 3, shown in Appendix A.1. Then, we can
graphically infer the following fundamental relations in our model economy, as a sub-game
perfect equilibrium outcome.
First of all, the parameter of price rigidity ￿eq is a decreasing function of the volatility of
exogenous shocks, as shown in Figure 2. Furthermore, the more risk averse are the consumers,
the higher is the degree of price stickiness in the economy.
Second, in Figure 3 one veri￿es that the parameter ￿ ￿, which measures the discretionary
weight for the aggregate output gap in the central bank loss function, induces a reduction of
the degree of price rigidity in the model economy.
4 Conclusions
The present study shows a possible way to ￿ll the research lacuna ￿rst stressed by Blinder et
al. (1998). We introduce a model economy in which ￿rms could choose prices according to the
Calvo￿ s approach. Nevertheless, the degree of price rigidity ￿eq is endogenously determined as
a sub-game perfect strategy pro￿le adopted by the ￿rms as an optimum response to consumers￿
risk aversion in an economy in which ￿rms are not subject to adjustment costs. This main
result is formalized in Theorem 2.
In other words, our main results imply that ￿rms monopolistically compete setting optimal
prices a la Calvo, and choosing the degree of price stickiness in a Bertrand￿ s game ￿ avor. In
equilibrium, such a behavior leads to a zero expected pro￿t ￿ ow, generalizing the traditional
result of zero per period pro￿t. However, we need to stress that this particular result depends
on the existence of ine¢ cient stochastic shocks.
It is interesting to note that such a result follows from the two types of competition inputted
in the model. The ￿rst one is the traditional monopolistic competition that allows each ￿rm
to choose an optimal price that maximizes its expected discounted pro￿t ￿ ow. The second one
36In such graphs, the baseline is the following parameters values: ￿ = 0:986 (6% per year); ￿ = 9:5; ￿ ￿ = 5;
￿ " = 0:15; ! = 0:25; ￿￿1 = 0:15; ￿
￿1
crit = 0:18; ￿
￿1
f = 0:20; n = 0:80; V "LB
crit = 2:1; ￿ = 0:12 and ￿￿y = 0:94. The
parameters relate to a quarterly frequency model.
24is the contribution of our modelling assumption on consumption centers. Indeed in the ￿rst
decision moment of each period t, households must decide from two "identical goods", namely
the homogeneous consumption centers. Therefore, an oligopoly game must be applied to model
the competition among both consumption centers. Since such a competition is conducted in
terms of the degree of price stickiness, the Bertrand game captured the strategic behavior.
Hence, the expected discounted pro￿t ￿ ows turned to be zero in the non-trivial equilibrium,
despite the fact that this is the best ￿rms can make optimally choosing their individual prices.
The results also show that the Lucas￿critique may apply, for the degree of price stickiness
is no longer a deep parameter. Moreover, a relevant extension of the Lucas￿critique is pre-
sented on the analysis. Since the degree of price rigidity depends on the distribution of the
stochastic process governing the cost shocks, traditional monetary evaluation exercises using
macro-econometric models are ￿ awed by a failure to recognize that the commonly estimated
relations, even with quasi-structural equations containing future expectations derived with an
ad hoc imposed nominal rigidity source, are reduced-form relations rather than truly structural
relations. This is due to the fact that structural changes in the stochastic process generating the
cost shocks may change the optimal degree of price stickiness chosen by the ￿rms. Hence, as a
policy oriented recommendation we may suggest the use of time-varying parameters economet-
ric models for monetary policy purposes, for it is di¢ cult to accurately assess the occurrence
of such structural breaks.
Furthermore, it is shown that the degree of ine¢ ciency captured by the parameter ￿y also
a⁄ects the nominal price rigidity by means of the parameter ￿￿y. Thus, this degree of ine¢ -
ciency can also be accounted as a source of price stickiness. In short, our analysis shows that
ine¢ ciency and uncertainty are both key sources of price rigidities in the economy.
Finally, our numerical simulations indicate that if the monetary authority chooses the mi-
crofounded parameter ￿, which captures the penalty of aggregate output gap variability in
the central bank￿ s loss function, and conduct a time consistent optimal monetary policy rule,
￿rms will optimally choose a full price stickiness, e.g. ￿eq = 1. In such an instance, the only
equilibrium occurs with ￿ = 0. Thus, under such a timeless perspective optimal monetary
policy rule, the central bank will not penalize the aggregate product volatility when choosing a
welfare maximizing criterion. As a result, prices will be completely stabilized while the product
dispersion will have its maximum volatility.
It is important to stress that such a strong conclusion relies: (a) on the Assumption 7 on
the existence of a steady state price level ￿ P; and (b) on the assumption on absence of any
preference disturbing shocks.
On the other hand, if the central bank chooses a discretionary weight ￿ ￿, under the assump-
tion of positive "t cost shocks, then the frequency of (optimal) price adjustments will be an
increasing function of the cost shock volatility. Furthermore, it is shown that the degree of
price stickiness is a decreasing function of the discretionary weight ￿ ￿.
Regarding possible extensions, the present analysis should also consider economies in which
there are also preferences and production technology shocks and e¢ cient shocks. In such a case,
consumers would not like that the price volatility generated by such shocks were completely
￿ltered. So, the technique applied in this study must be adapted, mainly regarding the fact
that preference shocks are consumers￿common knowledge and not a source of uncertainty.
Probably, the equilibrium degree of nominal price rigidity will be lower than the one derived in
this exercise.
Another important extension should consider model economies in which there is a persistent
level of in￿ ation that a⁄ects the agents￿optimal behavior. One can even extend the model for
the case of an open small economy. In that case, the inclusion into the model economy of an
import sector and exporter ￿rms strategically deciding how much to pass the exchange rate
volatility through their prices should be key elements.
25References
[1] Alves, Sergio A. L. and Waldyr D. Areosa (2005), ￿Targets and In￿ ation Dynamics￿ ,
Central Bank of Brazil Working Paper, 100 (Oct). Also presented at the BIS Autumn
Economists￿Meeting, 27-28 October, Basel.
[2] Amato, Je⁄ery D. and Thomas Laubach (2000).￿Monetary policy in an estimated
optimization-based model with sticky prices and wages￿ , BIS Working Paper, 87.
[3] Blinder, Alan S., Elie R. D. Canetti, David E. Lebow and Jeremy B. Rudd (1998), Asking
About Prices: A New Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness, New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
[4] Bonomo, Marco and Heitor Almeida (2002), ￿Optimal state-dependent rules, credibility,
and in￿ ation inertia￿ , Journal of Monetary Economics, 49-7: 1317-1336.
[5] Bonomo, Marco and Rene Garcia (2001). ￿The macroeconomic e⁄ects of infrequent infor-
mation with adjustment costs￿ , The Canadian Journal of Economics, 1 (Feb): 18-35.
[6] Caballero, Ricardo J. and Eduardo M. R. A. Engel (1993). ￿Heterogeneity and output
￿ uctuations in a dynamic menu-cost economy￿ , The Review of Economic Studies, 60-1
(Jan): 95-119.
[7] Calvo, Guillermo A. (1983): ￿Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximizing Framework￿ , Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 12: 383-398.
[8] Caplin, Andrew and John Leahy (1991). ￿State dependent pricing and the dynamics of
money and output￿ , The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106-3 (Aug): 683-708.
[9] Chakrabarti, Rajesh and Barry Scholnick (2005). ￿Nominal rigidities without literal menu
costs: evidence from e-commerce￿ , Economics Letters, 86-2 (Feb): 187-191.
[10] Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gal￿ and Mark Gertler (2002). ￿A simple framework for interna-
tional monetary policy analysis￿ , Prepared for Fall 2001 Carnegie-Rochester Conference.
[11] Debreu, Gerard (1975). ￿The rate of convergence of the core of an economy￿ , Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 2: 1-7.
[12] Dixit, Avinash K. and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1977). ￿Monopolistic competition and optimum
product diversity￿ , The American Economic Review, 67-3 (Jun): 297-308.
[13] Dotsey, Michael, Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman (1999). ￿State-dependent
pricing and the general equilibrium dynamics of money and output￿ , The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 114-2 (May): 655-690.
[14] Gal￿, Jordi and Mark Gertler (1999), ￿In￿ ation Dynamics: A Structural Econometric
Analysis￿ , Journal of Monetary Economics, 44-2: 195-222.
[15] Gal￿, J., Mark Gertler, and J. David L￿pez-Salido (2001), European In￿ ation Dynamics￿ ,
European Economic Review, 45: 1237-1270.
[16] Gal￿, Jordi and Tommaso Monacelli (2004), "Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatil-
ity in a Small Open Economy", Mimeo.
[17] Giannoni, Marc P. and Michael Woodford (2003). ￿Optimal in￿ ation targeting rules￿ ,
NBER conference on In￿ation Targeting in Miami, Florida (Jan): 23-25.
26[18] Hall, Simon, Mark Walsh and Anthony Yates (1997). ￿How do UK companies set prices?￿ ,
Bank of England Working Paper, 67.
[19] Kimball, Miles S. (1990). ￿Precautionary saving in the small and in the large￿ , Economet-
rica, 58-1 (Jan): 53-73.
[20] Loyo, Eduardo and Luciano Vereda (2004). ￿Can monetary policy be helped by domestic
oil price stabilization?￿ , Economics Department of PUC-Rio de Janeiro, mimeo.
[21] Lucas Jr., Robert. E. (1976), "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique", Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 1: 29-46.
[22] Ravenna, Federico and Carl E. Walsh (2006), "Optimal monetary policy with the cost
channel", Journal of Monetary Economics, 53: 199-216
[23] Rotemberg, Julio J. (2002). ￿Customer anger at price increases, time variation in the
frequency of price changes and monetary policy￿ , NBER Working Paper, 9320.
[24] Rotemberg, Julio J. and Michael Woodford (1997), ￿An optimization-based econometric
framework for the evaluation of monetary policy￿ , NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997:
297-346.
[25] Rotemberg, Julio J. and Michael Woodford (1998), ￿Interest-rate rules in a estimated
sticky price model￿ , NBER Working Paper, 6618.
[26] Walsh, Carl E. (2003), Monetary Theory and Policy, 2nd Ed., Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The MIT Press.
[27] Walsh, Carl E. (2005), ￿Labor market search, sticky prices, and interest rate policies￿ ,
Review of Economic Dynamics, 8-4 (Oct): 829-849.
[28] Woodford, Michael (2003), Interest and Prices, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[29] Woodford, Michael (2004), "In￿ ation Targeting and Optimal Monetary Policy", Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 86-4 (Jul/Aug): 15-41.
[30] Zbaracki, Mark J., Mark Ritson, Daniel Levy, Shantanu Dutta and Mark Bergen (2004).
￿The managerial and customer dimensions of the cost of price adjustment: direct evidence









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 q
s
-1
























0 5 10 15 20 l
aeq
Ve  = 1
Ve  = 0.25
Ve  = 0.05
Ve  = 0.125
Ve  = 0.01
Figure 3: Equilibrium Price Stickiness ￿eq as a Function of ￿ ￿
A.2 Firms￿pro￿t ￿ ow
Since the ￿rm i from Cj adjust its price with probability ￿, its possibility tree is the one
depicted in Figure 4 below, in which ￿ pj;t (i) represents a new price adjusted in period t and the
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Figure 4: Price Setting
As a consequence of the price setting process depicted in Figure 4, the probability distrib-
ution of each price ￿ pj;t (i) is the one shown in the following table:
Table 1: Prices Distribution
Period pj;￿1 (i) ￿ pj;0 (i) ￿ pj;1 (i) ￿ pj;2 (i) ￿ pj;3 (i) ￿￿￿ ￿ pj;￿ (i)
0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) 0 0 0 ￿￿￿ 0
1 ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 ￿ ￿) 0 0 ￿￿￿ 0















Therefore, given the previous distribution and considering that some properties of uniform
convergence apply, the ￿rm￿ s expected sum of pro￿t ￿ ow ￿d
j;0 (i) discounted at period t = 0
may be represented as in (66) if ￿ < 1.
￿
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 Under a timeless perspective, if a particular ￿rm i from Cj is present in the
market then its expected pro￿t E￿"￿￿
j (￿) is a decreasing function of the degree of nominal price
rigidity summarized by the probability ￿.
Proof. Assuming uniform convergence and considering all regularity assumptions previously









However, in order to determine the ￿rst derivative @￿￿
j (￿)=@￿ , it is easier to consider the
envelope theorem applied on ￿d
j;0 (i), previously de￿ned in (29).
29First of all, we determine @￿
d
j;0 (i)=@￿ considering some properties of uniform convergence



















T￿tQ0;T￿(￿ pj;t (i);Pj;T;Yj;T;wj;T (i);￿
"
T) +


























































































j;0 (￿) = argmaxE0
1 P
T=0
￿j￿TQ0;T￿( ￿ ;Pj;T;Yj;T;wj;T (i);￿
"
T), as a consequence
of the ￿rm￿ s problem (30) under sticky prices. Since pj;￿1 (i) is likely to be di⁄erent from p￿
j;0 (￿),


























































30Before applying the unconditional expectance operator, we need the following results:
(a) The timeless perspective implies that pj;￿1 (i) = p￿
j;￿￿ (￿) for some ￿ > 0, e.g. pj;￿1 (i)
is the most recent optimal price adjusted before the initial period t = 0.
(b) aggregate variables are independent on individual ￿rms￿decisions, e.g. Pj;t independs
on p￿
j;t (￿) for instance.



































































It is easy to verify that the expression inside the brackets sum zero. Therefore we obtain





Therefore, the expected pro￿t E￿"￿￿
j (￿) is a decreasing function of the degree of nominal
price stickiness ￿.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 Under a timeless perspective, suppose that the i-th ￿rm from Cj is present in
the market and adopts the probability ￿ of price stickiness, but when adjusting it decides instead
for the sub-optimal price p￿
j;t (￿ ￿), where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. In such a context the unconditional expectance
of ￿d




￿ (￿ ￿)) ￿ E￿"￿
￿
j (￿ ￿) for ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Proof. Note that ￿d
j (￿;p￿ (￿ ￿)) equals ￿d
j;0 (i) when the latter, de￿ned in (29), is evaluated in
￿ pj;t (i) = p￿







j;0 (i), its value-function ￿￿
j (￿) = ￿d




j (￿) ￿ ￿
d
j (￿;p
￿ (￿ ￿)) , 8￿ ￿ 2 [0;1] (68)
Moreover, since ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, the Proposition 1 implies that E￿"￿￿
j (￿ ￿) ￿ E￿"￿￿
j (￿). Thus,





￿ (￿ ￿)) ￿ E￿"￿
￿
j (￿ ￿) for ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Therefore, a pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm that optimally readjust its price with probability (1 ￿ ￿ ￿)
have its expected pro￿t decreased when increasing its price stickiness degree to ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ even











A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 Provided that restriction (37) is satis￿ed and that E￿"￿￿
1 (0) > 0, suppose that
the households always choose the C1, e.g. ￿1 = 1 and ￿2 = 0. Therefore, there is a small
enough probability ￿2 > 0 such that if the ￿rms from C2 announce the following price setting




t (0) , with probability (1 ￿ ￿2)
p2;t￿1 (i) , with probability ￿2
then all households realize that they have better changing their strategies to ￿ ￿1 = 0 and ￿ ￿2 = 1,
bene￿ting the ￿rms from C2.
Proof. Since households always choose the C1, the best response of all ￿rms from such a con-
sumption center is to adopt ￿ exible prices in all periods, e.g. ￿1 = 0, for either E￿"￿￿
1 (0) > 0
and such a strategy maximizes its expected discounted pro￿t ￿ ow as a consequence of Propo-




y1;t (i) = Y
n
1;t , 8i from C1 (70)










Note that Assumption (3) on regularity conditions implies that uC (￿) is invertible, so we












Moreover, from the production function (19), and relations (70) and (71) we obtain the
implied instantaneous labor disutility for consuming only in C1, as follows:














, 8i from C1 (72)
So far note that the ￿rms from C2 make a zero pro￿t, once their goods will not be demanded.
Suppose now that ￿rms from C2 decide to adopt the strategy (38) of readjusting to p￿
t (0)
with probability (1 ￿ ￿2), where ￿2 > 0 is su¢ ciently close to zero. Hence in the event in which
households change their strategy to ￿ ￿2 > 0, the ￿rms from C2 would make pro￿ts such that
E￿"￿d
2 (￿2;p￿ (0)) ￿ E￿"￿￿
2 (0) as predicted by Proposition 2.
Note that if E￿"￿￿
1 (0) > 0 implies E￿"￿￿
2 (0) > 0 if ￿ ￿2 > 0. Moreover, since the regu-
larity assumptions on preferences and production implies that E￿"￿d
2 (￿2;p￿ (0)) is a contin-
uos function in ￿2, Proposition 2 implies that there is a neighborhood close to zero in which
E￿"￿d
2 ( ￿ ;p￿ (0)) is positive and strictly decreasing. Therefore, if ￿2 is in such a neighborhood
then E￿"￿d
2 (￿2;p￿ (0)) > 0 in the event in which households change their strategy to ￿ ￿2 > 0.
32Now we test if the adoption of the previous strategy would induce the households to change
their strategy to ￿ ￿1 = 0 and ￿ ￿2 = 1. Adopting the previously described price setting strategy37,











From now on, we evaluate the representative household￿ s utility in case of opting to change
the choice strategy to ￿ ￿1 = 0 and ￿ ￿2 = 1. Similarly to the determination of (71) and (72),
we obtain the (potential) instantaneous utility and the implied labor disutility derived for



























{u;t = ￿2 (￿t P2;t￿1)




{￿;t = ￿2 P
1￿￿




Considering Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we apply the Jensen￿ s inequality twice and obtain the
following results:














































Since each decision on consumption centers can be thought as a lottery decision, we must
consider the expected utility to evaluate which consumption center is the most preferred one.
Therefore we apply the unconditional expectance operator into the previous inequalities:
















































37With such a strategy, the ￿rms from C2 smooth the ￿ exible prices adopted by the ￿rms from C1.
33Remember that ￿t independs on past aggregate variables38 and that aggregate prices inde-
pend on individual ￿rm price setting, for each single ￿rm decision cannot a⁄ect the aggregate
















































, it is straightforward to proof
that the instantaneous consuming expected utility obtained from consuming only in C2 is
strictly greater than the one obtained from consuming only in C1, as follows:
E￿"u(Y2;t) > E￿"u(Y1;t) (75)










. Hence it is also straight-
forward to derive the following result:





















Aggregating the previous expression over the support (0;1) and considering the uniform





























We now use the Assumption 8 on stationary distributions, the iterated expectation property
and the C2 price setting strategy de￿ned in (38) to derive the following steps on the right hand


















































































34Therefore, considering the result (72), it is straightforward to proof that the instantaneous
implied labor expected disutility obtained from consuming only in C2 is strictly lower than the




￿ (h2;t (i))di < E￿"
1 Z
0
￿ (h1;t (i))di (76)
The result (75) was not surprising since the price setting strategy adopted by the ￿rms from
C2 reduced the price volatility generated by the C1 price setting strategy. However, assessing
the implied labor expected disutility was not that trivial due to the wage channel. But, provided
that households are su¢ ciently prudent and risk averse, according to the inequality (37), we
could prove that the implied labor expected disutility obtained from consuming only in C2 was
strictly lower than the one obtained from consuming only in C1.
























Therefore, in each period t, the expected discounted utility ￿ ow obtained from changing
the household￿ s strategy to always choosing C2 (left hand side of the above inequality) is
strictly greater than the one obtained from always choosing C1 (right hand side of the above
inequality). Hence all households realize that they have better changing their strategies to
￿ ￿1 = 0 and ￿ ￿2 = 1, bene￿ting the ￿rms from C2, which then make positive pro￿ts.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 Provided that restriction (37) is satis￿ed and that E￿"￿￿
j (0) > 0, there is no
equilibrium in which the representative household always chooses the same consumption center.
Therefore, under such assumptions, households are indi⁄erent between consumption centers in
equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction and without loss of generality, that the representative house-
hold always chooses the C1, e.g. ￿1 = 1 and ￿2 = 0. Therefore, all ￿rms from C2 make zero
pro￿t since their goods have no demand.
However, provided the conditions of Theorem 1 above, if all ￿rms from C2 adopt the price
setting strategy de￿ned in (38) for a small enough probability ￿2 > 0, households realize that
they have better changing their strategies to ￿ ￿1 = 0 and ￿ ￿2 = 1, as implied by Proposition 3.
As a consequence, all ￿rms from C2 would make positive pro￿ts. Therefore, adopting such a
price setting strategy is a best response, in a context of sub-game perfect equilibria39, and so
￿rms have the incentives to adopt it.
Hence ￿1 = 1 and ￿2 = 0 is not an equilibrium strategy, for contradicting the statement of
De￿nition 4. Similarly, there is no equilibrium in which ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = 1. Thus, households
randomize choosing ￿1 2 (0;1) and ￿2 2 (0;1).
It is straightforward to conclude that households are indi⁄erent between consumption cen-
ters in equilibrium, otherwise they would always choose the favorite one.
39Note that there is a Nash equilibrium in which the households always choose a speci￿c consumption center
and all ￿rms from both consumption centers always adopt ￿ exible prices. Houever, such an equilibrium is not
a subgame perfect equilibrium.
35A.7 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 Provided that households are su¢ ciently prudent and risk averse, according to the
inequality (37) of above Lemma 2 and that E￿"￿￿
j (0) ￿ 0, equilibrium requires that all ￿rms
from both consumption centers adopt the same highest degree of price stickiness ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿eq,
for which the expected pro￿t is non-negative, e.g. E￿"￿￿
j (￿eq) ￿ 0, 8j. Non-trivial solutions
implies E￿"￿￿
j (￿eq) = 0, 8j. Otherwise, if E￿"￿￿
j (1) ￿ 0 then ￿eq = 1 represents the trivial
solution.
Proof. This theorem is proven for the non-trivial cases in which E￿"￿￿
j (0) > 0 and E￿"￿￿
j (1) <
0, 8j.
As predicted by Theorem 1, equilibrium requires that ￿1 2 (0;1) and ￿2 2 (0;1). Moreover,
























Let ￿1 and ￿2 be the strategies adopted by ￿rms from C1 and C2, respectively, who are
present in the market in the sense of Assumption 11. Hence Corollary 1 implies that they make
non-negative expected pro￿ts for adopting such strategies, e.g.
E￿"￿
￿
1 (￿1) ￿ 0
E￿"￿
￿
2 (￿2) ￿ 0
Suppose, by contradiction and without loss of generality, that ￿1 > ￿2 in equilibrium. Thus
Proposition 1 implies that E￿"￿￿
1 (￿1) ￿ E￿"￿￿
2 (￿2). From now on, we consider the non-trivial
case where the expected pro￿ts are strictly decreasing on the degree of nominal rigidity, e.g.
E￿"￿￿
1 (￿1) < E￿"￿￿
2 (￿2).
Since E￿"U1 = E￿"U2, if all ￿rms from C1 adopted ￿ ￿1 = ￿2 < ￿1 then they would make a
larger expected pro￿t, for consumers would remain indi⁄erent among the consumption centers41.
Therefore, adopting ￿ ￿1 = ￿2 < ￿1 is a best response for ￿rms in C1. Thus, ￿1 > ￿2 is not an
equilibrium outcome, for contradicting the statement of De￿nition 4. Similarly, ￿1 < ￿2 cannot
occur in equilibrium as well. Therefore, equilibrium requires that ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿eq, and such a
fact is a common knowledge to all ￿rms.
Suppose now, by contradiction, that E￿"￿￿
1 (￿eq) > 0. Consider the non-trivial case in which
￿eq < 1. Therefore, using a similar reasoning made to proof Proposition 3 above, there is a
probability ￿ ￿ > ￿eq in a neighborhood of ￿eq such that if the ￿rms from C2 adopted instead




t (￿eq) , with probability (1 ￿ ￿ ￿)
p2;t￿1 (i) , with probability ￿ ￿
40Note that Assumption 8 on stationary distributions implies that E￿"U1 and E￿"U2 independs on time.
41Since ￿ ￿1 = ￿2, the unconditional expectance on aggregate variables would be the same among the con-
sumption centers, thus there would be no di⁄erence in terms of consumption utility and labor disutility among
them.










36then all households would realize a best response of changing their strategies to ￿ ￿1 = 0 and
￿ ￿2 = 1.
Note that Proposition 2 implies that E￿"￿d
2 (￿ ￿;p￿ (￿eq)) ￿ E￿"￿￿
2 (￿eq) if the households
did not change their choices on ￿j. However, their best response would be to change them to
￿ ￿1 = 0 and ￿ ￿2 = 1, bene￿ting the ￿rms from C2, for the ￿rms￿expected pro￿ts would increase to
(￿2)
￿1 E￿"￿d
2 (￿ ￿;p￿ (￿eq)). Again, with a similar line of argument used to proof Proposition 3 one
easily shows that if ￿ ￿ is su¢ ciently close to ￿eq then (￿2)
￿1 E￿"￿d
2 (￿ ￿;p￿ (￿eq)) > E￿"￿￿
2 (￿eq),
e.g. the ￿rms from C2 realize that adopting the previous price setting strategy is a best
response in the case of E￿"￿￿
1 (￿eq) > 0. Hence, E￿"￿￿
j (￿eq) > 0 is not an equilibrium outcome
for ￿eq < 1.
In the case in which E￿"￿￿
j (￿eq) = 0, ￿rms would have no incentive to decrease even more the
degree of price stickiness, for such an action would make their expected pro￿ts to be negative.
Therefore equilibrium requires that E￿"￿￿
j (￿eq) = 0, if ￿eq < 1.
If E￿"￿￿
j (1) ￿ 0, one easily veri￿es that ￿eq = 1.
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